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All Things Being Equal...
John H. Garvey'
I will discuss the effect that the proposed Religious Equality
Amendment might have on existing First Amendment law. Let
me begin with the text of the proposed amendment. There are
actually two versions in circulation. The first version (the "Hyde-
Hatch Amendment") is set forth identically in House Joint Reso-
lution 121, sponsored by Mr. Hyde, and Senate Joint Resolution
45, sponsored by Mr. Hatch. It reads as follows:
Neither the United States nor any State shall deny benefits to
or otherwise discriminate against any private person or group
on account of religious expression, belief, or identity; nor shall
the prohibition on laws respecting an establishment of religion
be construed to require such discrimination.'
The other proposed amendment, sometimes bracketed with this
one but actually quite different in its intent, is House Joint Reso-
lution 127, proposed by Mr. Istook (the "Istook Amendment"):
To secure the people's right to acknowledge God according to
the dictates of conscience: Nothing in this Constitution shall
prohibit acknowledgments of the religious heritage, beliefs, or
traditions of the people, or prohibit student-sponsored prayer
in public schools. Neither the United States nor any State shall
compose any official prayer or compel joining in prayer, or dis-
criminate against religious expression or belief.2
I will confine my attention chiefly to the Hyde-Hatch Amend-
ment, which I view as a more interesting and plausible proposal.
To anticipate just briefly, my chief observation is that it would
not effect much change in existing law, except perhaps in the
area of aid to parochial schools.
* Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. This article is based on a
presentation given at a conference entitled "A Religious Equality Amendment?" held
at Brigham Young University on February 12, 1996.
1. 1.J. Res. 121, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (enacting clause omitted); S.J.
Res. 45, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (same).
2. HLR.J. Res. 127, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (enacting clause omitted).
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I will divide my remarks into three parts. The Hyde-Hatch
Amendment forbids the government to "deny benefits.., or...
otherwise discriminate .. .on account of religious expression,
belief, or identity." In the first portion I will concentrate on
forms of discrimination against expression, belief, or identity.
The second portion of my remarks will focus specifically on bene-
fits. In the concluding section I will briefly remark about the rule
of equality (or neutrality) which the amendment espouses.
I. EQUAL FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
A. Content Control
The most important substantive rule in free speech law is
that the government may not discriminate against speech on
account of its content.3 This goes for religious speech too. So far
as the Supreme Court is concerned, there is no need for correc-
tion on this point. The settled rule, consistently applied, is that
regulations of speech must be content-neutral. This is what I
understand the Hyde-Hatch Amendment to mean when it says
the government may not "discriminate ... on account of religious
expression."
The lower federal courts, the state courts, and state offi-
cials-public school officials in particular-have not been as
faithful to this rule. A good example of the kind of violation that
motivates the sponsors of the Hyde-Hatch Amendment is Guidry
v. Calcasieu Parish School Board.4 There a high school principal
ordered the class valedictorian to remove from her graduation
speech a section devoted to the importance of Jesus Christ in her
life. When she refused, she was stricken from the graduation
program. The district court sided with the principal; the court of
appeals affirmed without addressing the merits. If you want to
test your instincts on the case, imagine what the result would
have been if the speaker had talked instead about her admira-
tion for Abraham Lincoln or Martin Luther King.
3. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
4. 9 Religious Freedom Rptr. (Church-State Resource Ctr., Norman Adrian
Wiggins School of Law, Campbell Univ.) at 118 (E.D. La. 1989), aff'd on jurisdictional
grounds, 897 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1990).
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There are plenty of cases like Guidry.5 A constitutional
amendment would not change the law that the Supreme Court
applies to them, but it might bring the rules to other people's
attention.
B. Public Forum
It is sometimes suggested that there should be an exception
to the rule of content neutrality when people want to speak on
government property-that the government, like the owner of
private property, should be able to prefer its friends.6 The Su-
preme Court rejected this suggestion fifty years ago insofar as it
applied to traditional public forums-streets, sidewalks, and
parks. Many of these cases were brought by or against religious
speakers.7 What usually happened was that popular groups
(mainline religions, the Elks, the VFW) would be allowed to hold
rallies and services in the city park; unpopular groups (often Je-
hovah's Witnesses) would then be forbidden to do the same
thing. This is how the Court described the case of Capitol Square
Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette,8 decided last term. The
board denied permission to the Ku Klux Klan to put a cross on
the plaza outside the statehouse where other private parties had
put a menorah, a United Way display, and various art exhibits.
The Supreme Court held that the cross was entitled to protection
under the Free Speech Clause. The Court also held that allowing
the cross did not violate the Establishment Clause.
In addition to the rule of content neutrality, traditional pub-
lic forum law provides a right of guaranteed access that is good
even against nondiscriminatory controls. The Klan must be
5. See, e.g., Settle v. Dickson County Sch. Bd., 53 F.3d 152 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 518 (1995); Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 505 U.S. 1218 (1992); Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047 (10th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 505 U.S. 1218 (1992); Perumal v. Saddleback Valley Sch. Dist., 243 Cal. Rptr.
545 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 933 (1988); cf Hedges v. Wauconda Community
Sch. Dist., 9 F.3d 1295 (7th Cir. 1993); Garnett v. Renton Sch. Dist., 987 F.2d 641 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 72 (1993); and Johnson-Loehner v. O'Brien, 859 F. Supp.
575 (M.D. Fla. 1994), where the school boards engaged in content control but the
courts got it right.
6. Commonwealth v. Davis, 39 N.E. 113, 113 (Mass. 1895) (Holmes, J.), aff'd, 167
U.S. 43 (1897).
7. See, e-g., Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953); Niemotko v. Maryland,
340 U.S. 268 (1951).
8. 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995).
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treated like the United Way; but both of them could complain if
the government tried to close the park to all speakers.9
Recently the Court has refined its thinking about forums. We
still have the traditional kind, but now we also have designated
and nonpublic forums. A designated public forum is property
that the government voluntarily makes available for speakers.
Once it does, the requirement of nondiscrimination attaches. But
until it does, there is no guaranteed right of access, as there is to
traditional public forums. This is not a very large category. It
does not include airports, for example, where religious groups
have (along with others) been denied the right to solicit funds. °
It probably does include college campuses. This is how the Court
described the University of Missouri at Kansas City ("UMKC") in
Widmar v. Vincent." UMKC opened its facilities generally to
student groups but closed them to a religious group, Corner-
stone, that wanted to engage in religious worship and discussion.
The Court's holding in Widmar prefigured its decision in Pinette:
it decided that the students had rights under the Free Speech
Clause and that allowing them to use the forum did not violate
the Establishment Clause. Congress extended this principle to
secondary schools in the Equal Access Act, a law which the Su-
preme Court later upheld. 2
Government property that does not fall into either of these
two categories is a nonpublic forum. Here the government is al-
lowed to engage in some content discrimination: it can favor
some subject matters over others, but it cannot distinguish
among viewpoints. For example, a city might decide to open pub-
lic school gymnasiums in the evenings for basketball or Boy
9. Lillian R. BeVier, Rehabilitating Public Forum Doctrine: In Defense of
Categories, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 79, 108-09.
10. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 605 U.S. 672
(1992).
11. 454 U.S. 263, 267-70 (1981).
12. Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990). The Equal Access Act
provides:
It shall be unlawful for any public secondary school which receives Federal
financial assistance and which has a limited open forum to deny equal access
or a fair opportunity to, or discriminate against, any students who wish to
conduct a meeting within that limited open forum on the basis of the
religious, political, philosophical, or other content of the speech at such
meetings.
20 U.S.C. § 4071(a) (1994).
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Scout meetings. It would not thereby be obliged to let religious
groups meet. But suppose the city allowed the gym to be used for
lectures about family issues and child-rearing, but not for lec-
tures on those subjects from a religious perspective. That was
the issue in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School
District, which held that the school district had engaged in im-
proper viewpoint discrimination.
3
Notice that all three public forum rules embody a require-
ment of nondiscrimination-or as we say in speech cases, of con-
tent neutrality. Traditional and designated public forums forbid
all kinds of content control. Nonpublic forums forbid viewpoint
regulation, though not subject matter regulation. It is also set-
tled that the Establishment Clause poses no obstacle to protect-
ing religious speakers under these rules. Thus, ratification of the
Hyde-Hatch Amendment would make little difference in this cor-
ner of the law.
I must qualify this conclusion in two ways. First, the amend-
ment might forbid subject matter discrimination, now unlawful,
in nonpublic forums open to the public for limited purposes. A
school that opened its gym at night to adult groups for physical
fitness might have to schedule time for religious groups to do
Bible readings. This could be a bigger change than it appears to
be. It would apply to a broad range of government property
whose use is now restricted-jails, libraries, post offices, army
bases, train stations, etc. It would also have some effects on gov-
ernment employees. Here are two examples: (1) The United Way
(or the Combined Federal Campaign) is allowed into the work-
place to solicit annual contributions from employees. A rule pro-
tecting religious groups against subject matter discrimination
would allow them to solicit contributions in the workplace too.14
(2) Government offices have internal mail systems-boxes,
phones, e-mail, etc. If some people, (unions, say) are allowed to
use these systems to communicate with employees, then maybe
religious speakers would be entitled under the amendment to do
so as a matter of right." These are open questions because we
cannot be sure at this point what the proposed amendment
13. 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
14. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
15. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
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means by the phrase "discriminate ... on account of religious
expression."
The second qualification is this: the Free Speech rule about
traditional public forums (enforced in Pinette) is in some tension
with the Establishment Clause rule about holiday displays
(made in County of Allegheny v. ACLU'6 and Lynch v.
Donnelly7). Pinette held that it was constitutionally permissible
to put up a privately owned religious symbol (a cross) near the
Ohio statehouse. Allegheny held that it was constitutionally
permissible to put a privately owned religious symbol (a meno-
rah) near the city-county building, but not to put a different pri-
vate symbol (a creche) in the county courthouse. The message is
that there are at least some occasions when the no-establish-
ment rule trumps the no-discrimination rule. Four members of
the Court (led by Justice Scalia in Pinette) would not have it so.
They would prefer a clear rule that private religious speech in a
traditional public forum is protected by the Free Speech Clause
and not forbidden by the Establishment Clause. Two members
(Justices Stevens and Ginsburg) would apply just the opposite
rule: the Establishment Clause requires a secular public order.
The swing votes (led by Justice O'Connor) would engage in ad
hoc balancing in these cases to determine whether there is an
Establishment Clause violation.
The Hyde-Hatch Amendment sides with Justice Scalia in this
debate. It is clear that private religious speech is treated worse
in some of these cases than other kinds of private speech. The
only justification offered for that difference is that the Establish-
ment Clause requires different treatment. The Hyde-Hatch
Amendment would make it clear that it does not. It says that a
state cannot "discriminate against any private person or group
on account of religious expression ... ; nor shall the [Establish-
ment Clause] be construed to require such discrimination."
C. Government Speech
Discussion in the popular press is often careless about distin-
guishing between student prayer and "school prayer," which are
legally very different. Public school students have a constitu-
tional right under existing law to pray in school. What they
16. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
17. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
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sometimes lack is the opportunity. To remedy that deficiency,
some states have passed laws requiring a moment of silence.
These laws are constitutionally permissible if they are truly neu-
tral. (They can make space; they cannot stimulate the activity.) 8
On the other hand, school prayer-prayer composed or con-
ducted by a public school-is unconstitutional. There is no free
speech right at stake here because the First Amendment does
not protect the government as speaker, and the Establishment
Clause actively forbids it to engage in this kind of speech. That is
the holding of the School Prayer Cases. 9 The Court has extended
this principle, though only slightly, to cover the case where a
school invites a minister or rabbi to offer a prayer, as schools
often do at graduations."
The Hyde-Hatch Amendment would not change this law. Its
protection extends only to "private person[s]." It does nothing to
increase the government's own authority to conduct religious
services. The Istook Amendment, on the other hand, would work
a change. It states: "Neither the United States nor any State
shall compose any official prayer or compel joining in prayer."2' It
does not preclude school teachers from leading students in
prayers composed by someone else. Indeed it suggests the con-
trary when it states that the Constitution does not "prohibit ac-
knowledgments of the religious heritage, beliefs, or traditions of
the people." Here it refers to government acknowledgments, not
private ones. It takes those up in the next phrase, which says
that "student-sponsored prayer" is also permissible. If I read it
right, the Hyde-Hatch Amendment would leave Engel (a case
where New York composed its own school prayer) standing but
would overturn Schempp (a case in which Pennsylvania had stu-
dents read from the Bible and recite the Lord's Prayer).
I would make the same observations about the other kinds of
government speech that are litigated in Establishment Clause
cases, the rituals of American civil religion. Outside the public
schools the courts have generally been willing to uphold them.
These include such institutions as legislative chaplains, blue
laws, religious place names (San Francisco) and mottos ("In God
18. See Wallace v. Jaffiree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
19. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962).
20. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
21. H.R.J. Res. 127, supra note 2 (emphasis added).
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We Trust"), the display of religious artifacts owned by the gov-
ernment, and so on.2 The Supreme Court has tended to side
with the government in these cases, so there is not much work
for the amendments to do. The exceptions are the cases coming
from the public schools. For example, the Court has held that the
government cannot have the Ten Commandments posted in
classrooms or teach creation science alongside evolution.23 The
Hyde-Hatch Amendment would work no change in these cases
because they involve government, not private, speech. The Istook
Amendment would overturn them all. I think it is just this kind
of observance Mr. Istook has in mind when he includes the
phrase, "Nothing in this Constitution shall prohibit acknowledg-
ments of the religious heritage, beliefs, or traditions of the peo-
ple."
D. Groups
So far I have discussed speech of by private individuals and
by government actors. I want to conclude this section with a
brief discussion of private groups. The Hyde-Hatch Amendment
would prevent the government from "discriminatfing] against
any private ... group on account of religious ... belief, or iden-
tity." Here are a few examples of how this might happen. Sup-
pose two factions of the local Orthodox Church are at war over
whether to ordain women. If they decide they cannot live to-
gether they may (like the partners to a dissolving marriage) ask
a court to divide their property. The court might award the
church to the feminist faction because it finds that group's be-
liefs more enlightened than its rival's. Or consider a simpler ver-
sion of the same problem. The Catholic Church is less ambiva-
lent about the ordination of women-it cannot be done. Suppose
Utah passes a law condemning this as employment discrimina-
tion. In each of these cases the losing religious group could claim
that the government was discriminating against it because of its
beliefs. Whether the Hyde-Hatch Amendment would change the
22. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (creche owned by city); Marsh v.
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (chaplain); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961)
(blue laws). See generally Robert N. Bellah, Civil Religion in America, 96 DAEDALUS 1
(1967).
23. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (creation science); Stone v.
Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (Ten Commandments).
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law on this subject depends once again on what the proposed
amendment means by "discriminate."
I can imagine three solutions to this problem, each nondis-
criminatory, or neutral, in a different way. First, we might say
that the government acts neutrally in siding with the feminists
because it takes the same position when dealing with nonreli-
gious groups. Churches are treated like the Rotary Club and
United Airlines. This is the brand of neutrality approved by the
Supreme Court in Employment Division v. Smith.' As Professor
Douglas Laycock has pointed out, rules like this are neutral in
the formal sense that they do not talk about religion. (Laws for-
bidding all people to sleep under bridges are formally neutral in
this sense.) They are not neutral in their substantive effect on
religious observance. If our objective is to minimize the extent to
which the law affects people's religious practices, the neutral
solution is to leave both groups alone.
I doubt, though, that Smith governs these cases. Smith itself
made an exception for intra-church "controversies over religious
authority or dogma." ' Even if it had not, the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act would have reinstated prior law on this sub-
ject.26 Under that law there are two ways of leaving religious
groups alone. One is to leave religious disputes up to church au-
thorities. (Call this the rule of deference.) If the Orthodox Synod
of Bishops rules that the traditionalists should have the prop-
erty, that is the end of it. The other way is to let courts settle
disputes by applying the usual rules of property, trust, and con-
tract law to documents like the deed to the church, the church's
corporate charter, etc. (The Court calls this the "neutral princi-
ples" rule.27) If the deed favors the feminist faction, the court can
side with them and against the church hierarchy. Although the
government here is taking sides, the rule is neutral in the sense
that the parties are free to arrange any solution they like, so
long as they write it down before the dispute arises. Current law
allows a state to use either the rule of deference or the rule of
neutral principles. I have argued that the latter actually favors a
particular form of religious organization, by employing a default
24. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
25. Id at 877.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994).
27. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
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rule that undermines church hierarchies." But I doubt that the
Hyde-Hatch Amendment is designed to change existing law on
this point. Whether it does so inadvertently depends again on
how we interpret the term "discriminate."
II. EQUAL BENEFITS
A. The Trend Toward Neutrality
We are accustomed by our casebooks to think that Lemon v.
Kurtzman29 laid down an omnibus rule useful for solving all
kinds of Establishment Clause problems. In fact the rule was
formulated in a case about parochial school aid, and it is doubt-
ful that it ever made much sense outside that context. Indeed I
doubt that it was coherent within that context. Be that as it
may, there is a discernible trend in aid cases away from Lemon
and toward a rule of neutrality. The stronger this trend is, the
less effect the Hyde-Hatch Amendment will have on the law in
this area. Let me review briefly two steps on the path toward
neutrality. The first was taken by cases holding that neutrality
is a permissible solution to aid problems. The second, taken in
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia last
term, holds that neutrality may occasionally be required.0
The idea that the government might give benefits to religious
groups so long as it acted in a neutral fashion is first discernible
in tax cases. Walz v. Tax Commission of New York3 held that
the government could give property tax exemptions to religious
organizations, so long as they were included in a larger class of
nonprofit corporations. Although a large class of beneficiaries
seems to make the law neutral in the sense that it is religion-
blind, just as a college scholarship program for economically dis-
advantaged students is colorblind, that is not what the Court
had in mind. The tax law explicitly mentioned property used for
"religious, educational or charitable purposes,"" so we cannot
pretend that the state just paid no attention to religion. What
the Court really had in mind was what Professor Laycock calls
28. John I. Garvey, Churches and the Free Exercise of Religion, 4 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHIcs & PuB. POLf 567 (1990).
29. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
30. 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
31. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
32. Id. at 666-67 (emphasis added).
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substantive, rather than formal, neutrality-an attempt to mini-
mize government influence one way or the other on people's reli-
gious belief or practice.33 The Court explains that it must walk a
"tight rope" between establishing religion and restricting reli-
gious freedom.34 Tax exemptions are a form of aid, but so too are
taxes a form of constraint.
The Walz neutrality principle was extended to school aid in
Mueller v. Allen in 1983."5 In that case the state allowed tax de-
ductions for certain school expenses-tuition, transportation,
and textbooks. The Court stressed two features that made this a
neutral tax break. First, this was just "one among many deduc-
tions"-there were others for medical expenses and charitable
contributions.36 Second, the deduction was "available for educa-
tional expenses incurred by all parents," no matter whether their
children were in public or private school.37 Unlike the law in
Walz, this one was formally neutral (it did not mention religion),
and the Court seemed to stress that view of neutrality in uphold-
ing it.
Three years later in Witters v. Washington Department of
Services for the Blind, the Court upheld an outright grant of edu-
cation assistance to a student attending a Bible school under a
state law designed to aid the visually handicapped.' Witters re-
turned to the more sensible neutrality theory of Walz. It stressed
the fact that the state made funds available to all blind people,
and that the choice to apply the funds toward religious education
lay with the recipient. The law, the court said, "creates no finan-
cial incentive for students to undertake sectarian education."39
Up to this point the Court had only allowed the government
(sometimes) to enact neutral aid programs,4" but it had never
required the government to do so. In fact, the State of Washing-
33. Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantiue, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward
Religion, 39 DEPAuL L. REV. 993, 1001-06 (1990).
34. Walz, 397 U.S. at 672.
35. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
36. Id. at 396.
37. Id at 397.
38. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
39. Id at 488.
40. Additional evidence on the same point is provided in Bowen v. Kendrick. 487
U.S. 589 (1988), which allowed grants under the Adolescent Family Life Act to religious
(and other) organizations that gave teenagers counseling and education about sex and
pregnancy.
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ton, on remand in Witters, declined for reasons of state law to
give money to blind students at Bible schools. Last term, how-
ever, the Court held in Rosenberger that the government was
sometimes required to give financial aid to religious students if
it gave aid to similarly situated nonreligious students.41
Rosenberger is a case about speech, so I do not want to overstate
its importance for school aid generally. The Court held that if
Virginia was going to pay student fees for the printing of student
publications, it could not exclude a publication that took a Chris-
tian point of view. The Establishment Clause permitted and the
Free Speech Clause required the school to distribute aid in a way
that was viewpoint neutral. Consider this analogy: suppose that
instead of paying a printer to publish student work, Virginia had
set up its own laser printer and allowed student organizations to
use it. The two cases are hard to distinguish, but the hypotheti-
cal resembles Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free
School District,42 where the government allowed some view-
points but not others to be heard in a nonpublic forum.
I do not want to overstate the trend toward a rule of neutral-
ity. I will qualify it in the next section. But I think there is an
observable tendency outside the area of parochial school aid to
uphold laws that distribute benefits in a way that is substan-
tively neutral, i.e., that moves the needle as little as possible
toward or away from religion. Where this rule is applied, the
Hyde-Hatch Amendment will not do much to change existing
law.
B. Parochial School Aid
I wish I could say that the whole corpus of law about benefits
was being ironed out in this way, but that would be wishful
thinking. It is still probably true that the government may not
pay tuition for parochial school students, though it pays tuition
for public school students,43 nor may it pay the salaries of paro-
chial school teachers-even teachers of secular subjects-though
41. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2523
(1995).
42. 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
43. Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
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it pays the salaries of public school teachers." These rules are a
residue of the Lemon test, which exalted separation above neu-
trality as the key to interpreting the Establishment Clause.
These rules maintain that the government should not fund pro-
grams that will inevitably be used to defray the costs of religious
activities.' (In the case of teachers of secular subjects, the Court
adds the plausible assumption that religion pervades the curric-
ulum in parochial schools.)
These rules are still standing, but they are deteriorating. The
separationist principle at the heart of Lemon is at odds with the
Court's more recent jurisprudence about benefits. School
aid-even tuition grants-is defensible under almost any version
of neutrality. A voucher program, or a program that paid the
salaries of all math teachers, would be formally neutral in the
sense that it need not mention religion. Neither would under-
mine the principle that the government should not pay for reli-
gion because (to use Jesse Choper's phrase) the government gets
"full secular value for its money."46 Both programs would be sub-
stantively neutral in the sense that they would not influence the
direction of people's religious choices. In this regard both are
more neutral than the current system, in which the government
(by offering free secular education) makes religion a relatively
less attractive option than it would otherwise be. As a doctrinal
matter I would argue that Witters settles the constitutionality of
vouchers.
So Lemon is decayed at the core, though the Court has not
yet admitted it. It is also peeling away at the edges, and this is
something the Court has acknowledged. I have in mind not the
big things like tuition and salaries but the little things like ther-
apeutic services, counseling, and remedial instruction. The rule
has been that the government cannot provide these services on
parochial school premises.47 This was the farthest reach of the
Lemon doctrine, resting as it did on some highly implausible as-
sumptions about how the government's aid provides collateral
support to religious activities. But in Zobrest v. Catalina Foot-
44. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
45. For a more detailed explanation of how this principle is worked out, see John
IL Garvey, Another Way of Looking at School Aid, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 61.
46. JESSE H. CHOPER, SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERT 177 (1995).
47. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); School Dist. of Grand Rapids
v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
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hills School District," the Court allowed the government to pro-
vide a sign-language interpreter for a student at a Catholic high
school, even in religion classes and at mass. The program, the
Court said, was constitutional because it provided benefits in a
neutral way to all handicapped children. This meant that the
government exerted no influence on the choice to attend public
or parochial school; that was left to the parents. Though the
Court purported to distinguish the earlier cases about on-pre-
mises services,49 I think they are inconsistent with a faithful ap-
plication of the neutrality principle.
Given the unsettled state of the law here, this is an area
where the Hyde-Hatch Amendment would likely have an impact.
To begin with the most obvious point, the second clause of the
amendment states that the Establishment Clause shall not be
"construed to require" discrimination against religious groups in
the apportionment of benefits. This pretty clearly means that
Lemon is out and Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest are in. Thus, it
ought to be permissible under the proposed amendment to give
neutral aid to parochial schools.
The first clause of the amendment may say more than that.
It declares that the government "shall [not] deny benefits" to
religious groups on account of their "expression, belief, or iden-
tity." This seems to mean that aid to parochial schools is re-
quired if the government is going to give aid to other schools.
There is another possible reading, however. One could plausi-
bly argue that when the government funds public but not paro-
chial education, it does so not on account of the latter's religious
nature but for unrelated reasons. Some say, for example, that we
should pay for public schools because they are more economically
and racially diverse than private schools, and thus prepare stu-
dents better for citizenship in a heterogeneous society.'0 I doubt
the factual premise of this argument. But if we assume that it is
correct, it is fair to say that parochial schools are not left off the
gravy train on account of their religious character. This does not
affect my first point, that under the Hyde-Hatch Amendment aid
48. 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
49. 1d. at 11-13.
50. See Michael W. McConnell, The Selective Funding Problem: Abortions and
Religious Schools, 104 HARv. L. REV. 989, 1013 (1991).
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should be permissible. It only undermines the argument that aid
is required.
III. Is EQUALITY DESIRABLE?
I have already considered the effect the proposed amendment
would have on current doctrine. I will close by considering a
broader question. The First Amendment already gives us a guar-
antee of religious freedom. Do we need a new guarantee of reli-
gious equality?
In one respect, religious equality is a more modest ambition
than religious freedom. In Employment Division v. Smith the
Supreme Court held that the Free Exercise Clause did not pro-
tect religious actors against "neutral, generally applicable ...
law[s]." This was a departure from the old doctrine, which Con-
gress quickly moved to reinstate in the Religious Freedom Resto-
ration Act ("RFRA") 2 According to the old doctrine, religious
freedom exempted people from neutral, generally applicable laws
which truly burdened religious practice, unless the government
had a compelling reason to insist on conformity.' This was the
reading of the First Amendment favored by the supporters of
religious rights six years ago.
There is an apparent inconsistency between that argument
for freedom and the current argument for equality. Supporters of
RFRA object to neutral laws and ask for special treatment; sup-
porters of the Hyde-Hatch Amendment want neutral laws and
equal treatment. But at a deeper level both may be pursuing the
same objective. A rule cannot be formally neutral if it makes an
exemption for religious actors, but it may be substantively neu-
tral if it is the best way to minimize the law's effect on people's
religious choices. For example, a law forbidding the consumption
of wine, though it is formally neutral, criminalizes the perfor-
mance of certain important religious rituals. This is a powerful
force against religion. An exemption for wine drunk in religious
ceremonies is not formally neutral, but it is not a very strong
force pulling people toward religion. As Professor Laycock says,
only a law professor or an economist would argue that "the pros-
51. 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990).
52. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994).
53. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963).
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pect of a tiny nip would encourage some desperate folks to join a
church that uses real wine."54 It may be, then, that freedom and
equality are not inconsistent claims but are actually tied to-
gether. Real freedom means substantive neutrality, or treating
all choices equally.
I now want to consider the point at a still deeper level. The
idea that we should treat all choices equally is what I might call
the standard liberal account of freedom. In this account, freedom
is a bilateral right: if we are free to do x, we are also and neces-
sarily free not to do x. The freedom of speech lets us say what we
want. It also lets us remain silent-it protects the right not to
salute the flag,55 not to display government slogans,56 and not to
support causes we dislike.5" Freedom of the press works the
same way-it protects the right not to publish opposing points of
view.58 Reproductive freedom allows us to have children-it pro-
tects us against compulsory sterilization and limits (like the Chi-
nese have) on the number of offspring we may have. But it also,
and more prominently, is said to guarantee the right not to have
children-to prevent their conception in the first instance and,
failing that, to abort them.59 Liberals take the same view of reli-
gious freedom. It obviously protects my right to worship God ac-
cording to the dictates of my own conscience. But it has also been
used to protect atheists and agnostics, not just believers: a state
cannot require officeholders to declare that they believe in God.6"
Liberal theory offers a number of reasons why freedoms
should have this bilateral character. One is political; it helps to
keep the peace if the Constitution shows equal respect for people
on both sides of hot issues. This neutralizes claims of favoritism
and feelings of envy and resentment. By refusing to play favor-
ites, the government signals culturally ascendent groups that
54. Laycock, supra note 33, at 1003.
55. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
56. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
57. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 115 S. Ct. 2338
(1995); Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1 (1990); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S.
209 (1977).
58. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
59. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).
60. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); cf Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S.
333 (1970) (protecting the right of a conscientious objector to object on nonreligious
grounds).
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they cannot hope for domination. Accomplishing this ambition
would be no small thing. Hobbes says that "the first, and funda-
mental law of nature ... is, to seek peace, and follow it."'1
A second argument for the bilateral character of freedoms in
liberal theory is moral rather than political. It says that the gov-
ernment should not interfere with the choices we make because
it is good for us to live autonomous lives. To be autonomous is to
make rules for oneself. This is not possible if the government can
prescribe what is orthodox in religion, politics, or family plan-
ning.
There are still other justifications that we might consider,'
but I think I have said enough to show that there is, in liberal
theory, a deep connection between freedom and equality. The
conventional right to freedom is, as John Rawls says, a right to
equal freedom.' And reasons like the ones I have mentioned
help to explain the appeal of Professor Laycock's principle of sub-
stantive neutrality. The government should not make laws that
affect the outcome of our religious choices; or if that is impossi-
ble, it should make laws that affect our choices as little as possi-
ble. By following this injunction the government shows respect
for our autonomy and helps us to live together in peace.
This is an appealing picture. It seems to assemble all the
pieces in a coherent way, show the direction the Supreme Court
is heading, and be fair and open-minded while still giving a good
deal of protection to religious liberty. Nevertheless, it has real
problems. The idea of equality or neutrality as a rule of thumb is
useful for solving many First Amendment problems, but it is
nothing more than that. It is not a fundamental value that pre-
cedes, encompasses, or explains religious activity. Rather, inso-
far as neutrality makes sense in this context, it follows from our
religious commitments and serves them.
The most obvious problem with the ideal of neutrality is that
it is not neutral all the way down. As Steven Smith has ob-
served, behind Professor Laycock's vision of neutrality lie "a set
of controversial beliefs about the nature and value of religion,
61. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 85 (Michael Oakeshott ed., Basil Blackwell 1947)
(1651).
62. I discuss these issues at some length in my forthcoming book: JOHN H.
GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? (forthcoming Fall 1996).
63. JOHN RAwis, A THEORY OF JusTiCE ch. 4 (1971).
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the proper function of government, and human psychology."64
These
include the premises (a) that religious beliefs and practices are
valuable and deserving of greater respect than many other
kinds of beliefs and practices toward which governmental "neu-
trality" is not required (b) but only if religious beliefs and prac-
tices are voluntarily chosen-in a very strong (and somewhat
underspecified) sense of "voluntariness."'
A really neutral theory would require that the government show
equal respect for all our choices, so that we could be completely
autonomous. Of course this would cover choices for and against
religion, but it would give the same kind of consideration to
choices about automobile design, bass fishing, and lawn care.
The Bill of Rights is silent about those activities, and proponents
of neutrality are understandably reluctant to extend their theory
that far. In order to explain why the government must be neu-
tral about religion and not lawn care, however, we must suppose
that there is something special about religion.
It is easy to imagine what that something might be. The peo-
ple most responsible for adding the guarantee of religious free-
dom to the Constitution wanted it because they thought that
serving God was the most important thing they did-much more
important than fishing or lawn care."G For them the real point of
religious freedom was to protect actions rather than choices. The
focus was on doing, not choosing. The First Amendment is not
part of an integrated system for promoting human autonomy. It
protects certain kinds of activities because those are especially
good things to do.
This seems a bit naive" and old-fashioned. It is also inconsis-
tent with the liberal assumption that freedoms are bilateral. If
religion is a good thing, blasphemy is not. We ought to protect
one "and stamp out the other. It seems to follow from my argu-
ment that neutrality is a pact with the devil. The government
64. STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE 81 (1995).
65. Id.
66. I have in mind the evangelical supporters of the First Amendment, whose role
Professor McConnell describes in Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical
Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990).
67. The word is Michael Sandel's. See Michael J. Sandel, Moral Argument and
Liberal Toleration: Abortion and Homosexuality, 77 CAL. L. REV. 521 (1989).
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should discriminate in favor of religion and against the alterna-
tives. Shouldn't it?
Not exactly. I argue that the First Amendment is concerned
with doing, not choosing, but I also think that (1) the doing must
be voluntary, and (2) we have a certain range of action. Let me
begin with the first of these qualifications-that religious actions
must be done voluntarily. This is not just a restatement of the
liberal argument that we must be left free to make choices. The
goal of the liberal approach is to foster individual autonomy, be-
cause "autonomy ... [is] the best thing that there is.' s I main-
tain instead that actions must be voluntary in order to be reli-
giously efficacious. The need to make choices thus follows from
the goodness of religion, rather than the other way around.
Locke makes this point in his Letter Concerning Toleration:
"[Tirue and saving religion consists in the inward persuasion of
the mind, without which nothing can be acceptable to God. And
such is the nature of the understanding, that it cannot be com-
pelled to the belief of anything by outward force."' Or to take a
more modern statement, consider the observation of the Second
Vatican Council: "God willed that man should be 'left in the hand
of his own counsel,' so that he might of his own accord seek his
Creator and freely attain his full and blessed perfection by cleav-
ing to him."7
The doctrinal implications of this point are familiar and com-
fortable. It follows from the goodness of religious practice that
the government may not regulate religious expression because of
its content.7' And it follows from the qualification that practice
must be voluntary that the government may also not compel reli-
gious expression. Torcaso v. Watkins is right: the state should
not require officeholders to believe in God.72 The School Prayer
Cases are also right: the state should not make children pray.7"
Let me turn now to my second qualification-that our free-
dom protects a certain range of action. I have said that I dispute
68. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN TIHE LIBERAL STATE 368 (1980).
69. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER
CONCERNING TOLERATION 129 (J.W. Gough ed., MacMillan Co. 1956) (1690).
70. GAUDIUMi ET SPEs 17 (quoting Sirach 15:14).
71. See supra parts IA-B.
72. See 367 U.S. 488 (1961); see also supra text accompanying note 60.
73. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421 (1962); see also supra text accompanying notes 19-20.
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the liberal assumption that freedoms are necessarily bilateral,
like a two-way street on which people must be allowed to travel
east or west. I think religious freedom protects the right to reli-
giously motivated actions because they are inherently good. The
point of freedom is to let us travel in just one direction (west, let
us say). Still, there are a lot of ways to go west from here. This is
what I mean by a range of action. This qualification too has
fairly familiar doctrinal implications. It explains why, though
eastward travel is not an activity we value highly, the govern-
ment should be careful about regulating it, lest it obstruct the
meanderings of people taking a circuitous route west. Take, for
example, laws against blasphemy. I would not say, as liberal the-
ory might, that blasphemy and prayer are equally eligible
choices. But I would oppose the regulation of blasphemy, because
it could be a stop on somebody's route west. Deifying Jesus will
offend Jews and criticizing Muhammad will anger Muslims, yet
Christians may do these things in their efforts to find God.
In all these examples, my anti-liberal theory of freedom pro-
duces results basically similar to the results of liberal theory
(though I would say that it gives more convincing reasons for
them). It lets people act voluntarily and gives them room to ma-
neuver. But what about the case of benefits (which I consider
above74)? Benefits do not inhibit voluntary action nor limit our
room to maneuver, so they present a different kind of problem.
Here too a rule of neutrality works fairly well. It would be
bizarre to hold that the government could discriminate against
religion in handing out benefits. Such a holding might not limit
religious freedom, but it would hurt the cause of religion; and my
theory begins with the assumption that religion is a good thing.
It would be perverse to run a program designed to discourage
people from doing a good thing. Rosenberger reaches the right
conclusion about this. As for parochial school funding, I hesitate
to say that the Constitution requires aid. As I noted above,7" the
government might withhold aid not because it wished to discour-
age religious practice, but because it wished to encourage some
other good which, it claimed, only public schools could provide.
This would be permissible. Governments often have to make
hard choices about where to spend money-on NASA or funding
74. See supra part I.
75. See supra part II.B.
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for the arts-and it is not perverse to favor one over the other.
By the same token, it is always an option to give some to every-
one. This is the situation with parochial school funding. Though
it may not be required, it is certainly permissible.
The Constitution allows equal benefits (a rule of neutrality).
Might it allow more? If the government can lean either way in
funding good things, might it discriminate in favor of religion?
Might it, for example, prefer parochial schools over other schools
because they teach religion, and religion is good for kids? Might
it not sponsor churches on the same theory? My theory is in real
trouble if the answer is yes. This was, after all, what Patrick
Henry proposed in his Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers
of the Christian Religion, and its defeat figures prominently in
the history of our own Establishment Clause. But we must not
forget that it was chiefly a religious coalition that defeated
Henry's Bill, and that there are compelling religious reasons for
rejecting government patronage. Madison offers several in his
Memorial and Remonstrance." First, government patronage will
make government the judge of religious truth, as government
sponsorship of the arts makes it the judge of beauty. That is a
very bad thing from a religious point of view, because there is no
reason to think that government officials know or care more
about religious truth than the rest of us. Indeed there is reason
to fear that they care less. They are especially subject to the
temptation, as Madison said, to "employ Religion as an engine of
Civil policy."" The Secretary of Education, for example, would
naturally prefer to fund parochial schools that teach the kind of
religion most compatible with his ideal of citizenship. I do not
trust the Secretary of Education to be a faithful guide to finding
God. I prefer the guidance of revelation, tradition, grace, and
religious authority. 8
Second, we may lose interest in our own religious affairs if
we turn over to the government the job of supporting them. I
76. JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS
ASSESSments paras. 5-7 (1785), reprinted in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 298, 301
(Robert A. Rutland & William M.E. Rachal eds., 1973).
77. Id. par. 5.
78. This is an argument that applies not just to funding, see supra part II, but
also to some kinds of government speech, see supra part I.C. I do not want the
Secretary of Education composing prayers even if children are excused from saying
them, because I have no special faith in the Secretary's wisdom or holiness. (Of course,
I have in mind the ideal type. I do not mean to cast aspersions on the incumbent.)
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send my children to Catholic schools, and I periodically serve on
boards and committees concerned with the religious curriculum.
Participants in these discussions, especially teachers, often la-
ment that parents want to turn over to the school the entire job
of religious formation. Parents seem to forget, teachers say, that
they are themselves primarily responsible for educating their
children in the faith. 9 Madison makes this kind of claim about
aid to religion: "During almost fifteen centuries, has the legal
establishment of Christianity been on trial. What have been its
fruits? More or less in all places, pride and indolence in the
Clergy; ignorance and servility in the laity; in both, superstition,
bigotry and persecution."0 Thus a rule of neutrality in regard to
benefits may also be desirable from a religious point of view. The
government should not discriminate either against or in favor of
religion.
Let me add one final point on this subject before passing on
to my last observation. What I have just said about the dangers
of government patronage could be turned into an argument
against even neutral support for religion. Might not evenhanded
financial support lead to heresy and indolence as easily as favor-
itism would? I confess to certain misgivings on this point. The
problem has not arisen to date in school aid cases because the
programs always give the state "full secular value for its
money."8 The government never pays for religious instruction; it
pays for subjects taught in public schools or books, equipment,
and other services offered there. So the issue of heresy, or gov-
ernment deciding questions of religious truth, does not arise. As
to indolence, the government does help religious groups with
their fundraising when it pays them for providing education or
social services. These are costs they would have to cover in any
event, so public aid frees up money for other uses and enlarges
the group's budget. But why use as our standard the budget the
group would have in a world where everything was the same ex-
cept for this grant program? In a world where there were no
school taxes at all, parents would have a lot more money to
spend on religious education. Maybe more of them would do so.
79. I sometimes think that the Social Security system has had a similar side
effect; it has made us forget our own role in caring for the aged.
80. MADISON, supra note 76, para. 7.
81. CHOPER, supra note 46, at 177; see also supra text accompanying note 46.
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In that case too, religious groups would be richer. It may be that
equal funding more closely approximates the state of affairs
where people most earnestly support religion than any of the
alternatives.
Now for my last word. The anti-liberal theory of freedom is
fairly well served by rules of neutrality in cases involving reli-
gious expression, government speech, and benefits. I would not
say this about the problem of exemptions. Employment Division
v. Smith held that religious actors have to obey "neutral, gener-
ally applicable ... law[s]" just like everyone else.' My theory
provides a very straightforward reason for treating them differ-
ently: they are doing a good thing and the government should
not interfere with them. This is why the Constitution guarantees
religious freedom. Recall that liberal theory has a hard time ex-
plaining why we should exempt people who were making reli-
gious choices, but not people who were pursuing other kinds of
personal interests. Since all choices are equal in the eyes of the
law, we should not show special consideration to one set. My the-
ory does not face this conflict. It argues that the point of the
First Amendment is to promote the good of religion, and we
should use whatever rule-neutrality or freedom-best serves
that purpose.
82. 494 U.S. 872, 880 (1990).
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